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Law and biomedicine and the making of ‘genuine’ traditional
medicines in global health
Emilie Cloatre
Kent Law School, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK
ABSTRACT
This paper explores the joint roles of law and biomedicine in constituting
the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate (and genuine and
‘pseudo’) traditional healing. It argues that, as law and biomedicine
have grown to share common understandings of the nature of knowl-
edge, they have come to act as converging colonizing forces that dis-
place and alter ‘other’ forms of knowing and ordering. Even as regulatory
systems set out to recognize some forms of traditional medicine, they
continue to operate on assumptions that disqualify knowledge, products,
and actors, that do not resemble their biomedical counterparts. This
leaves traditional healing systems potentially having to either operate
outside the law or adapt to it by transforming themselves, potentially
beyond the point of recognition, to ﬁt better into the systems provided
by law and biomedicine. The paper explores the series of dilemma this
creates for those seeking to ‘regulate better’ traditional medicine.
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This paper interrogates the convergence of biomedicine and law and its relationship to the
present and futures of traditional medicine. It explores how regulation of traditional healing
shapes the bound between the ‘genuine’ and the ‘pseudo’, and what this can teach us about
the relationship between law and biomedicine in global health. It argues that as law and
biomedicine have grown to share common understandings of the nature of knowledge and
how it can be proven or attributed, they act as converging colonizing forces that displace and
alter ‘other’ forms of knowing and ordering. Accordingly, even as regulatory systems set out to
recognize some forms of traditional medicine, they often operate on assumptions that dis-
qualify knowledge, products, and actors that do not resemble their biomedical counterparts.
Consequently, traditional healing systems either operate outside the law, or adapt to it by
transforming themselves to align to ‘legitimate’ systems of law and biomedicine. While such
regulatory movements have long historical roots, they have been intensiﬁed by the advance of
industrialization in biomedicine and the expansion of global markets in medicine. Throughout
this paper, biomedicine is understood not only as a ﬁeld of knowledge, but also as a ﬁeld of
practice of which marketization, industrialization and standardization have become signiﬁcant
constitutive parts.
Traditional medicines cannot always be proven according to the usual tests of biomedicine
(Adams, 2002). As knowledge-systems, they also sit at the crossroads of legal dilemmas that
contribute to the deﬁnition of the ‘genuine’ and the ‘pseudo’ in global health. Accordingly,
traditional medicine is a useful entry point to question the constitution of the ‘pseudo’, understood
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here as that which occupies the fringes of global health, being neither fully recognized as
medicine, nor entirely dismissed as ‘fake’. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the term pseudo
reﬂects my own reading of the value of traditional medicine. Instead, I suggest that it reﬂects
a common position in law and policy, both in global health and across national jurisdictions.
Traditional medicines are bound up in questions of legality and illegality of practice, ownership of
intellectual property and the politics of knowledge. In addition, traditional medicines are
a particularly acute illustration of the socio-cultural and political stakes of the nexus between law
and biomedicine: they fold into the long history of the emergence of biomedicine as a main actor
of global health and constitute a ﬁeld in which superimposed patterns of dominance and exclusion
(be they colonial or gendered, for example) have been particularly acute. These features have
acquired further salience through the rise of global markets, systems of manufacturing and
standardization.
Since the 1970s, public health actors, notably the World Health Organization (WHO), have paid
increasing attention to the potential challenges and opportunities that traditional medicines pose to
public health systems (World Health Organization, 1978; WHO, 2013). Over time, policies have
promoted better integration of traditional health systems with biomedicine. In response, anthropol-
ogists have been critical of such normative discourses and have argued that, in practice, such moves
may facilitate the disappearance of valuable diﬀerences between traditional and biomedical systems
(although one should also attend to possibilities to resist such pressure) (Janes, 1999; Lock
1990; Wahlberg, 2008). More recently, attention and policy discourses have focussed on the ‘regula-
tion’ of traditional medicines. Regulators, encouraged by the WHO, have argued that regulation could
improve the delivery of traditional healthcare (WHO, 2013). Here, the law has been tasked with
ﬁnding ‘the right’ balance between protecting patients against potential misuse of traditional
therapies, or, indeed, against practices or products that may be inherently dangerous, while author-
izing those considered valuable or useful. Additionally, the law is deemed important in improving or
maintaining standards of practice within professions, and/or for products (McHale, 2014). These ideas
have been implemented with considerable diversity. However, some common features appear across
regulatory systems. Notably, a seemingly neutral drive for ‘better regulation’ masks an embedded
and reiﬁed set of assumptions about what constitutes genuine ‘knowledge’ from a legal perspective.
For example, in its latest Traditional Medicines Strategy (2013), the WHO appears to make at least two
assumptions. First, that a distinction can and should be drawn by regulation between ‘traditional
medicines of proven quality, safety and eﬃcacy’ (WHO, 2013, pp. 8 & 17) and their others. Although
presented as an objective triage between the ‘proven’ and the unproven, the strategy also suggests
that proof is constituted on a register of evidence imbued with scientiﬁc language. Second, that
a legal distinction can be superimposed onto this medical demarcation to diﬀerentiate between the
regime applied to therapies which can be proven or not – be it ‘mere belief’ or ‘pseudo’ therapies.
Such distinctions and dichotomies have also been relevant to IP systems and the broader politics of
knowledge (Coombe, 1998; Dutﬁeld, 2009).
This paper makes two main arguments. First, that the aforementioned assumptions and their
embedding in law are problematic and performative, reshaping the future of healing systems as they
set out to regulate them, and eﬀacing alternative epistemologies. Second, it argues that the role law
plays in these movements, and in the constitution of the genuine and the pseudo, are not incidental
to broader market forces: there is a symbiotic relationship between law and biomedicine, as joint
tools of socio-economic power and governance, which reiﬁes and obscures processes of assimilation
in knowledge production. As legal systems look to regulate ‘better’ traditional medicines, they rest on
the only tools that the law has developed to distinguish the genuine from the pseudo in medicine:
those of biomedicine itself. The examples drawn from the paper are from a range of jurisdictions.
However, the paper is primarily grounded in a project focused on the regulation of traditional
medicines in Europe and Africa. I focus my analysis on the European context, while using it to reﬂect
on other parts of the world (notably in Africa) that are seeking to, or have recently introduced, legal
frameworks for traditional medicine.
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The case of the Redmeadow plant
To contextualize this paper, it is useful to illustrate some of the key patterns that have been
decried in the ﬁeld of traditional medicine, and the type of stories I am building this paper
around. In order to facilitate this, I use a composite example of an imaginary plant – a ‘pseudo
example’. Like many objects operating in the blurry space between real and fake, Redmeadow
borrows its features from a gathering of realities, but these were rearranged to facilitate the
arguments in this paper and to illustrate them with a ‘too-ideal-to-be-true’ (and therefore
simpliﬁed) example. The value of this approach is that it distils the key features of the genuine
examples, without having these entangled with details speciﬁc to those examples which are
unrelated to this paper. It also enables me to point to some of the key features of the ﬁeld within
a single and relatively short narrative. The example of Redmeadow is inspired by both scholarly
literature and everyday examples, gathered in the media and from my empirical research. For
readers keen to relate it to more real-life context, I have weaved in references to both plants,
healers and laws that have fed into this composite. The story illustrates the many dilemmas that
plants used for medicinal purposes are caught up in when encountering the law. It is also about
how such plants’ identities and possibilities are shaped by their interface (experienced or
theoretical) with biomedicine. The aim of this pseudo-example is to highlight some of those
dilemmas and incoherences, and their political implications. The rest of the paper turns to
analysing the role that law, and its historical relationship with biomedicine, plays in such stories.
Redmeadow has been used by healers across Southern Europe and parts of Africa since at least
the XVth century. It is believed to have numerous properties, notably for respiratory conditions, and
as anti-spasmodic. It has also been used by midwives both around childbirth and as an arbotifacient.
While Redmeadow was commonly used in Southern Europe until the nineteenth Century, it has
progressively been replaced by other drugs. This is, in part, because the popular healers who
transformed Redmeadow into healing decoctions have progressively disappeared from everyday
health practices, to be replaced by doctors, nurses and professional midwives, and by new
treatments.1 Furthermore, new laws in Southern European states have prohibited anyone other
than pharmacists to sell Redmeadow in its unprocessed form.2 Used in excess, Redmeadow can
have side-eﬀects that regulators want to see controlled by pharmacists.3 As pharmacists lost interest
in plants in Europe, and progressively stopped stocking them, Redmeadow has become rare in
everyday healing in Europe. Lately, as folk herbalism is regaining interest, some would like to reopen
its use and distribution, but the law limits such possibilities.
Meanwhile, in Africa, Redmeadow has followed a similar path, though complicated by coloniza-
tion. While it is unclear precisely when healers started using Redmeadow, it was commonly used by
the time of colonial invasion. As healers were progressively penalized by colonial powers,
Redmeadow became marginalized, often hidden to avoid accusations of sorcery.4 Soon, colonial
laws formally banned it and other plants used in rituals and healing.5 However, since decoloniza-
tion, Redmeadow has become tolerated again. It is still not, however, fully legalized. Notably, in
states where Redmeadow has been most commonly used, and even though they are usually not
applied anymore, old colonial laws still only permit biomedical doctors to treat patients.6
Recently, however, States have started to accept that traditional healing may have value,
providing it can prove its eﬀects. How can the healing powers of Redmeadow be proven? For
traditional healers, or herbalists reviving old techniques for which there is ample testimony,
evidence seems aplenty. However, legally, such evidence is anecdotal, and thus insuﬃcient. To
be considered ‘proven’, Redmeadow must be studied following certain standards. This requires
money, equipment and conditions that traditional healers cannot easily access, meaning it can only
be proven through other means. Those with resources can provide the necessary evidence by
isolating some of Redmeadow’s properties and testing them in clinical trials. However, it soon
becomes clear that this evidence relates to particular chemical compounds of Redmeadow, which
need to be produced in laboratory conditions. Precise measurements of how much of
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Redmeadow’s chemical compounds will be taken by patients are crucial for it to be legally used
and sold.
Soon Redmeadow, as tested in laboratory conditions, has been replicated by various manufac-
turers who, with the right equipment, quickly reproduce the precise substance that has proven its
eﬃcacy. It is turned into carefully weighed tablets, packaged in foil and plastic, and distributed
through global market networks. The fact that Redmeadow is a plant (even if in its new form it no
longer looks likes one) which has long been used in traditional healing renders it attractive to
patients around the world who are keen to use less ‘drugs’ and more ‘natural’ products. Before
long, Redmeadow thrives in global markets, adapting its packaging to customers preferences.7
Meanwhile, for healers and herbalists, the (il)legality of Redmeadow used as a ‘plant’, and not
carefully measured tablets, remains unchanged. While some continue to use it, they are severely
restricted by law and their practice is undermined as potential patients are able to ﬁnd the plant as
tablets. Other healers decide to adapt, and beneﬁt from the opportunities that the new faces of
Redmeadow may oﬀer. They start using Redmeadow in its new form, change their practices and
use, and introduce new techniques.
In this story, the possibilities oﬀered to Redmeadow to circulate, be used, sold, and transformed
have been heavily conditioned by law. Some may argue that here the legal system has facilitated
the use of a traditional plant in a form that is proven and able to satisfy the high standards of
modern healthcare. However, the law has also contributed to the very redeﬁnition of Redmeadow
as a healing device: it has approved its form that is most replicable, and in turn most industrial, and
more ‘like a drug’ in the sense of biomedicine. In turn, those that use or sell Redmeadow have been
replaced, or changed their practices, to ﬁt better into the biomedical system. The sets of rights and
claims that surrounded Redmeadow have also inevitably changed. Those who do not ﬁt the new
system, or who do not see tablets as ﬁtting their practice, have remained illegal. And while the
system is arguably more ‘open to traditional medicine’, it may be less likely to tolerate those who
do not conform. In this paper, I am interested in these various eﬀects and what they tell us about
law’s role in ordering socio-medical relationships, and about the particular relationships of law and
biomedicine. A central question is what do these relationships imply for the possibilities of
traditional medicines, such as Redmeadow, to be considered as ‘genuine’ objects of healthcare?
If we are to facilitate the use of ‘traditional’ healing, could the law be reimagined in a way that
enables Redmeadow to be seen as a healing device in and of itself?
Approaching law in global health
In thinking through this issue, I approach law as a complex, often unpredictable, but also politically
charged arbiter of ‘genuine medicine’. We know that law participates in setting the boundaries of
legitimacy, and indeed often works jointly with science to produce these boundaries (Cloatre &
Pickersgill, 2014). Socio-legal scholarship has also shown that law is contingent, uncertain, and
multidirectional, resulting in modes of action that are not always (or not only) those it claims to
follow, and resting on socially and politically loaded assumptions, and histories, that it does not
always make apparent. Finally, law is performative, producing some of the realities that it sets out
to regulate (Cloatre & Cowan, 2019).
Those features of law are particularly interesting in the context of medicine, and examining the
interactions between these two powerful institutions renders visible some of the patterns of power
that they produce, both individually and together. Law, like biomedicine, claims particular forms of
neutrality and objectivity; yet, like biomedicine, it has a long history of violence and exclusion.
Global health, understood here as the gathering of spaces in which global inequalities in health-
care are formed and challenged, provides important sites and perspectives from which to reﬂect on
law and biomedicine. Such features play out at diﬀerent levels, and through multiple legal and
regulatory mechanisms, in the context of traditional medicine. Such legal mechanisms includes
those pertaining to the regulation of products (including, as a core example, herbal medicines),
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both in relation to their marketing (eg. market authorization, traditional herbal registration) and to
the place and conditions of their sale (prescription vs over the counter medicines; pharmacists vs
herbalists vs supermarkets). Such regulations, in addition to formal state requirements are also
created by soft law, guidelines, codes, and standardized documents. Other relevant regulations
include those on therapeutic practices (including the civil law concept of ‘illegal medical practice’,
later exported to colonies); professional regulations and registrations; or rules on training and
protections of title. Jurisdictions vary in how those connect and are organized. While some systems
have preserved signiﬁcant monopolies of therapeutic practice for biomedical professionals, others
have introduced a selective recognition and regulation of speciﬁc traditional medical systems.
Finally, some states have sought to organize in a generic manner ‘traditional medicine’ and often
focus implicitly on legitimizing and valuing local traditions of healing.8
In the remainder of this paper, I argue that although some of these approaches to law seem
a priori more appealing than others to those who want to promote and value traditional medicine,
relying on law in itself carries a certain political and ideological ‘baggage’. This means that the role
of law as one technique of legitimation needs to be observed critically, both for its eﬀects on the
regulated ﬁeld, and for practices that fall outside of it. Of course, law is only one mode of
legitimation for traditional medicine: however, given its keen embracing by the WHO and others,
it seems useful to put it to scrutiny.
My examination of traditional medicines builds on two strands of legal scholarship. One
examines illegality, and argues that illegality is best conceived as a state of precarity and negotia-
tion (Cloatre, 2018; Cloatre & Enright, 2017; Peterson, 2014). Boundaries between legality and
illegality are always revisited and transgressed, producing ‘grey’ or ‘pseudo’ zones of careful
practice and negotiation rather than the clear dichotomies that regulators may set to create.
When thinking about the eﬀects of law and illegality in practice, it is important to think not only
about the direct, planned or expected eﬀects of law, but also about its eﬀects in reshaping social
relations in excess of its stated aims. Here, the question is about exploring what legal restrictions
mean for the everyday uses of plants like Redmeadow and associated practices. The other strand of
legal scholarship examines ownership and valuing in intellectual property law (IP). One eﬀect of IP
is to allocate value to the ‘genuine’ against intrusions from the ‘fake’ or ‘pseudo’. As others have
demonstrated, IP regimes are deeply political, and representative of particular Eurocentric and
industry-driven understandings of what constitutes ‘genuineness’ yet they mediate the possibilities
for particular knowledges and products to access markets and condition their value (Coombe,
1998; Krikorian & Kapczynski, 2010). Straddling these two sets of questions, traditional medicines
are a unique site from which to question the divide between practices considered suﬃciently
valuable and real to be integrated within public health systems, and those permanently excluded.
Power relations through law and biomedicine
As legal systems seek to determine what can lawfully be sold or practised, questions arise as to
what kind of knowledge can help arbitrate the boundary between the ‘genuine’ and ‘pseudo’. In
this section, I argue that assumptions by the WHO and others that ‘proven and genuine’ traditional
medicines can be separated from the unproven and/or illegitimate derive partly from the dom-
inance and colonizing nature of biomedicine and from its long-standing embracing by the law. This
has been rendered more salient by the embedding of biomedicine in industrial modes of produc-
tion and the demands of global markets. Law and biomedicine have, arguably, shared and
deployed a narrative about the nature of genuine knowledge in medicine since at least the
nineteenth century: that genuine, modern knowledge should be aligned with a particular scientiﬁc
discourse, provable through scientiﬁc tests, and that it should be clearly separated from spirituality
and ‘beliefs’ (Adams 2002; Gaudillière, 2007). These assumptions remain present, even where
policies suggest a need to more generously embrace the ‘others’ of biomedicine. To understand
the implications of such assumptions, it is useful to brieﬂy look ﬁrst at their histories, even if for
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reasons of space these can only be sketched. While the colonizing history of biomedicine and law
have been thoroughly explored individually, their interaction has been given less speciﬁc attention.
European context
In looking at law’s role in facilitating the expansion of biomedicine within Europe and colonial contexts,
a ﬁrst (perhaps obvious) point to make is that this role was not conﬁned to legitimizing ‘truth’ or
‘scientiﬁc evidence’, but was intimately connected to broader political and institutional struggles for
empowerment and disempowerment (Porter, 1999; Ramsey, 1977). In Europe, the driving away of other
healing practices by law (including criminal law), as law embraced the scientiﬁc logics of biomedicine,
were also about the reorganizing of powers such as those of church vs state, popular culture vs the
elite, and the role of women in public life (Ehrenreich & English, 2010; Ramsey 1999). In the various
movements that surrounded the legitimizing and delegitimizing of various professionals, with and
through law, and as the make-up of the sphere of ‘genuine healthcare’ was redesigned, processes of
marginalization at play were linked to broader trends of power and exclusion. The role of law in
excluding forms of medical knowledge along lines that met those of class or gender was sometimes
direct (for example in forbidding particular practices, or earlier in the deﬁnition of what constituted
witchcraft rather than healing), and sometimes indirect (for example, in France, as biomedicine became
the only legally recognized means to treat patients, women were not admitted in universities – and
therefore eﬀectively denied the possibility to be legal healers). In both cases, the result was the
organizing of lines of legitimacy in care and medicine along lines of dominance and exclusion that
were political; their embedding in scientiﬁc narratives, however, disguised them as otherwise.
Traditional healing and colonialism
With colonial expansion, and as biomedicine became a powerful tool of domination and popula-
tion control, the separation of ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’, or ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’, was central to
the settlement of socio-political power (Bigon, 2012; Echenberg, 2001; Langwick, 2011; Vaughan,
1991). Here it is worth recalling two key aspects of the history of colonial medicine. First, that legal
rationalities played a signiﬁcant role in the settlement of power through knowledge that underlies
much of this history (Comaroﬀ, 1993; Echenberg, 2001). Throughout colonial history, the claims of
biomedicine as a particular source of objective knowledge became embedded and solidiﬁed in
regulatory decisions (for example, in determining who was legally allowed to be in certain spaces,
where housing and settlements could be built, but also which healing practices were permissible).
Arguing that recently acquired (yet often uncertain) biomedical knowledge was ‘more useful’ (or
‘more modern’) than its local alternatives, legal institutions set to reorganize populations in a way
that violently empowered some over others.
Second, colonial medicine worked to alter and replace local nosologies and healing traditions
with its own classiﬁcations and deﬁnitions (Langwick, 2011). In organizing governance over bodies
and populations, lines were redrawn between what could be seen as constituting healing or
witchcraft, knowledge or belief. These lines operated both as speciﬁc sites of interventions in
medical practices, and as part of a broader process of controlling through knowing and unknow-
ing. This broader process was, in turn, at times animated by an ambivalent eﬀort to borrow yet
reject, or to appropriate and assimilate. These dynamics are still pertinent today and reﬂected in
the ambivalence underlying the regulation of traditional medicine, which I return to below (Adams,
2002; Wahlberg, 2008).
Industrialization and the demands of global markets
The joint history of law and medicine became complicated further by the relationship between
regulation, biomedicine, and industrial modes of production. As biomedicine became an industrial
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enterprise, it also became dependent on new systems of authorization, standardization and replic-
ability. Measurements, procedures and devices became necessary to be able to prove that a drug
released to circulate in the market was precisely that which had been authorized (Gaudillière, 2013).
The very nature of biomedicine as an institution became co-dependent on those modes of organiza-
tion and validation (Gaudillière, 2007; Keel, 2011). The need to demonstrate ‘eﬃcacy’ became an
integral part of this institution: for medicines to be approved and considered as such onto markets
and in law, it became inevitable that they should be able to demonstrate their eﬃcacy, and an
eﬃcacy that could be replicated under any similar circumstance, and in which subjectivity, faith and
personal beliefs could have no place.
The ambiguity in how the WHO approaches the division between ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’ can
be read in the light of these particular histories. If the WHO accepts that beliefs may be recognized
as part of traditional medicine, the place of such practices in the health system is also denied by
the need to regulate through proof of ‘eﬃcacy’. Elsewhere in WHO guidelines and documents, this
has been translated into a need to ﬁt into particular procedural and standardized models that are
characteristic of biomedicine, and seek to isolate objective physical and measurable phenomena
from individual experience. Where beliefs, faith, or the ‘unexplained’ form a constitutive part of
health practices, some of their elements may sit outside such remit of proof, and their eﬃcacy may
become unprovable to those seeking a purely objective or physical demonstration (see also
Friesen, 2019). The question of what to regulate, and how to regulate it, cannot exclusively be
solved by an attention to therapies that have been able to prove themselves under the terms of
biomedicine. This however creates dilemmas for regulators that I turn to in the next section.
Law, biomedicine and the displacement of alternative epistemologies in healing
Redmeadow’s dilemmas can be explored through a critical evaluation of how law and biomedical
expectations continue to shape possibilities for genuine alternatives in health. In this last section,
I argue that eﬀorts to distinguish ‘scientiﬁcally proven’ traditional medicines from ‘beliefs’ may
contribute to further reifying the limits to pluralism that law and biomedicine have invested in
creating and maintaining. This can be seen through two movements: ﬁrst, the continuing exclusion
and precarization of practices that are not ‘provable’ under the terms of biomedicine, where
regulatory systems embrace such understanding of proof uncritically; second, a process of assim-
ilation, where alternative practices are incorporated into formal health-care systems only if they
‘look more like’ biomedicine. I explore each of these eﬀects in turn. Readers should note that I leave
out one scenario here, where traditional medicine would be neither legal nor illegal but left out of
law altogether and regulated through alternative systems of ethics or traditional practice – where
medical pluralism meets legal pluralism. Here, my focus is instead speciﬁcally on what centralized
state regulation means for traditional medicine, and why it deserves careful and critical attention.
Law, evidence and their ‘misﬁts’
In this section, I explore the implications of failing the standards set by law to determine what
constitutes ‘valid’ traditional medicine in the eyes of the state. Although each legal system will
design those boundaries with varying rigidity, some practices will always overspill and fail to meet
regulatory standards of proof. In some legal systems, practices that have not proven themselves
suﬃciently or through the right routes might simply be ‘unregulated’, and therefore permitted
unless explicitly breaking the law (as is arguably the case in the UK). Their position ‘outside’ the law
will impact, however, on their ability to thrive: for example, they will be limited to the private
spaces of healthcare, and titles will not be protected by the state. More striking however are
jurisdictions where therapies and therapists that are not explicitly regulated are ‘illegal’, as in
France. Notably, where new systems of regulation are put into place to recognize the ‘proven’, and
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depending on the phrasing of the law, therapies that have not been proven may de facto be
brought into illegality.
However, as both socio-legal scholarship and everyday events demonstrate, illegal practices
never disappear: they instead become hidden from view, which often results in a certain precarity
of practice and use (Cloatre & Enright, 2017). ‘Illegal healing’ is no exception here. For instance, in
France, despite very strict laws restricting all ‘diagnosis and treatment’ to biomedical doctors and
no legal recognition of professions such as naturopaths or Chinese healers, alternative medicines
are known to operate (Cloatre, 2018b). In such contexts, unlawful practices tend to develop careful
systems of negotiation to ensure that they remain within certain lines of acceptability: this may
mean remaining hidden away from public view, or operating within particular lines of representa-
tion, rhetoric or practice, and it always means organizing to avoid crossing the (often unpredict-
able) lines that may bring formal sanctions (Langwick, 2011; Marsland, 2008). Eﬀectively, for the
law, these practices come to constitute the spaces of pseudo-healing, outside what regulatory
regimes formally recognize. Importantly, the precarity that this potential illegality may produce has
safety implications: ‘the pseudo’, once implicitly stamped as such by law, is less formally governed
and therefore less ‘safety-checked’. The heavy systems of checks and regulations that surround
‘health professions’ and ‘medicinal products’ are not often applied to the same extent to treat-
ments and individuals excluded from these categories. Here, the very aim of regulation to facilitate
better health through better safety may be more diﬃcult to obtain if it does not account for the
possibility to engage the pseudo as well as the proven.
Furthermore, those that are legally unproven and do not ﬁt the law’s understanding of knowl-
edge also face precarity in ownership and valuing. The misﬁt of global intellectual property with
traditional knowledge systems has been extensively documented (Coombe, 1998). In the eyes of
intellectual property law, valuable knowledge continues to be, predominantly, a particular form of
processed knowledge deﬁned under the terms of science. This idea of value has implications for
the genuine and the pseudos of global markets: as they are stuck between precarity of practice and
precarity of valuing, pseudo-medical systems are also inevitably conﬁned to the edges of global
markets (Adams, 2002). Products that can travel are also those that get ﬁnancially rewarded
because they are identiﬁable at a particular point in time, traceable to a particular process of
invention, and replicable in ways compatible with industrial production and are thus ‘genuine’ in
the eyes of the law. Those able to engage most with tests and procedures designed for biomedi-
cine can be both legitimate actors of health provisions and legitimate knowledge-holders. Law is
important here because the global markets which therapeutic products, or indeed healers, may
seek to access are shaped by such regulatory possibilities.
Regulation, displacements and assimilation
Having looked at the double precarity experienced by ‘unproven’ products and practitioners, this
section considers what happens to therapies that are deemed ‘genuine’. It focuses on the processes of
‘inclusive exclusion’ that are at play in the transformations, negotiations and adjustments required to
be deemed ‘genuine’. As the law sets out to regulate ‘better’ the messy ﬁeld of traditional medicine, it
contributes to reshaping the very deﬁnition and nature of that ﬁeld, often in excess of the law’s stated
aims. This happens through a process of negotiation and assimilation, in which responses to legal
regimes reinforce the inﬂuence and epistemologies of biomedicine. If legal systems are to rest on
a division between that which can be scientiﬁcally proven and that which cannot an eﬀect is to trigger
other therapeutic knowledge-systems into explicitly positioning themselves in relation to science
(notably in its industrial expression) as they seek to engage with law.
An important characteristic of industrial science, relevant both in the transmission of knowl-
edge, but even more visibly to the making of products, is its replicability. ‘Proven’ therapies are also
those that are able to be perfect duplicates of what has been tested. For products, escaping the
sphere of the pseudo is therefore not only about being proven, but also dependent on both an
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ability to be measured and to be replicated (Ecks, 2013; Wahlberg, 2008; Osseo-Asare 2014). This
ability often depends on the product itself: plants are inherently less measurable than their
industrially produced extracts, which in turn renders raw herbal treatments less replicable than
manufactured ‘herbal products’ – Readmeadow itself is less replicable than its tablets.
Similarly, where professions seek further recognition by the law, they commonly seek to enrol the
framings of science that the law expects. States may also require forms of training and knowledge
transmission for its traditional healers that are akin to science. For example, herbalists in France seek
to engage pharmacology in their quest for formal recognition (Cloatre, 2018b; Garreta, 2006), and
courses in traditional medicines are part of recent regulatory framing of traditional medicine in
Ghana (Cloatre, 2013). Such engagements with science by the professions are always done with some
ambivalence. Tradition and science may be called upon selectively to assert both diﬀerence from the
biomedical, and assimilation of the discourses and modes of recognition that surround it. As healers
seeking recognition navigate between eﬀorts to be recognized through assimilation and through
diﬀerence, assimilation is crucial to being legally accepted, although there is always scope to
creatively resist the law and its preferred model of practice (Pordié & Hardon, 2015). Overall, as
regulators seek to engage more actively alternative or traditional medicines, they are also expecting
them to be more standardized, replicable and auditable, both in terms of their professions and of
their products (Bivins, 2010; Wahlberg, 2008). Those who do not comply will remain in the grey zones
of unlawfulness.
Conclusion
As therapies are folded into legality, or are required, through law, to be proven and replicable, an
eﬀect of regulation is the transformation of the products and practices in question. Of course, at
one level, this is precisely the aim of law: for example, to promote safety, regulation may mean that
professional qualiﬁcations and product quality will be checked; or indeed that the line between
what ‘works’ and what does not need to be drawn. However, the law always has eﬀects that do not
form part of its oﬃcial script: it is always performative, creating the realities it has imagined but also
producing unintended consequences.
In the ﬁeld of traditional medicine, the lines between the genuine and the pseudo are navigated
and established through regulation. While contemporary regulation seemingly embraces a broader
range of therapies, regulation also contributes to making the ‘genuine’ more uniform, and, in
eﬀect, more like biomedicine. Such transformations of therapeutic practices in response to regula-
tion are visible around the globe, and are about more than merely adjusting to be more ‘perfor-
mant’ – or in other words about more than creating ‘better therapies through better regulation’:
they deeply transform and translate the very nature of particular therapies (and, through them,
networks of empowerment in medicine). Legally recognized practices may bear little resemblance
to the systems and ideologies that they originated from, while those continue to operate on the
edge of oﬃcial legal systems. Redmeadow becomes Redmeadow-pills on global markets, remain-
ing as Redmeadow plant mostly in discreet illegal spaces – and in nature, of course.
Importantly, as the drive towards proof and replicability separates the proven from the pseudo,
and knowledge from belief, the spiritual dimension of particular healing systems disappears from
sight, transforming the cultural make-up of those therapies: it is the ‘thing’, and not beliefs
surrounding it, that are at stake when dealing with proof. Here, the law participates in reshaping
other systems to appear less like alternatives, and more like biomedicine. As law has come to
understand the boundaries of legitimacy through biomedical language and logics, it is necessary to
question to what extent regulating diversity without restraining such diversity, and regulating
without assimilating, remains possible. Importantly, these processes also create new lines within: as
the ‘genuine’ is expanded in scope, yet assimilated in its making and practice, the unassimilated
becomes ‘othered’. Within particular practices, strands that are legitimated and those that are not,
may split and co-exist, generating new spaces of ‘genuine’ and ‘pseudo’ therapies, and legality and
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illegality: healers wishing to continue using Redmeadow as a plant will do this in the precarity of
illegal spaces, while those willing to turn to pills will have new opportunities. Whether law can be
turned to without triggering such processes remains an open question.
The point here is not to deny the value of state regulation of traditional medicine per se. Indeed,
within the demands of regulation and global markets, some Asian medicines in particular have
successfully developed new paradigms and what Pordié and Guaudillière (2014) have analysed as
an ‘alternative modernity’ in the pharmaceutical making. However, such capacity to resist, deviate
and reinvent is not always successful, and requires signiﬁcant institutional and economic power.
For regulators keen to reinvent the traditional in a new form of modernity, there is value in paying
attention to ‘what happens next’ when new legal regimes are created, and to anticipate the
displacements at play: notably, zones that fall into grey areas of regulation and practice need to
be anticipated and accounted for. For some practices, legitimacy may depend neither on the terms
of biomedicine nor those of the law, and it may be resistant to external intervention or super-
imposed categories of validity.
Notes
1. Including under the eﬀects of new legal restrictions, such as notably in France with the Loi du 19 Ventôse an XI
(10 March 1803) on illegal medical practice.
2. For example in France only pharmacists are allowed to sell plants (bar an list of 148 exceptions – on which the
plants cited in fn12 do not belong) since 1941.
3. Here and later in the story, readers will ﬁnd features of Redmeadow echoing with the stories of numerous
plants such as ephedra, calendula, cornﬂower, artesimia, or St John’s wort.
4. For an exploration of the complex interface between witchcraft, healing and regulation see Ashfordth (2005).
5. Here the story simpliﬁes some of the multiplicity in the application of colonial laws traditional healers. The
transfer of the1803 law on illegal medical practice by France to its African colonies, where it was applied in
a variety of ways, is a notable example.
6. For example, this is the case in Senegal or Cameroon, although it is not straightforwardly applied in practice.
7. As a comparison see the story of Hoodia as recounted in Foster (2016).
8. Here one may think of the examples of France or Senegal for the ﬁrst scenario (though with contrasting stakes
and practices); China, India or Mauritius for the second; and Ghana or Burkina Faso for the third.
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